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Abstract: Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay 
for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and 
organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and 
extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how system-generated motives (e.g., attaining 
specific organizational goals, preventing sanctions, or garnering rewards) stack up against 
autonomously generated, intrinsic, or service motives.? We found through both quantitative and 
qualitative data that for teachers in the charter schools a constellation of public service motives pre-
dominated: diffuse pro-social commitments, ideologies of fairness and equity, a belief in the moral 
deservingness of deprived student populations in opposition to societal neglect, and identification 
with one’s work as a personal calling. By comparison, monetary rewards were embraced as already 
deserved. Neither rewards, nor accountability, seemed to regulate behavior in a deep way. Prestige 
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was not bestowed by official performance statuses within the accountability system, but flowed from 
judgments, personally communicated, by students, parents, or colleagues who had direct contact 
with teachers’ work.  
Keywords: work motivation;  self-interest; service ethic; pay for performance; accountability; social 
disadvantage 
 
La motivación de los maestros para trabajar en la era de los incentivos extrínsecos: 
Objetivos de desempeño y compromisos pro-sociales al servicio de la equidad  
Resumen: Conscientes de la decadencia de la rendición de cuentas y de la decepcionante evidencia 
de las evaluaciones de los sistemas de pago por desempeño en los EE.UU., nos preguntamos por 
qué la gestión mediante incentivos extrínsecos y por fijación de objetivos organizacionales ha sido 
menos poderosa de lo que los diseñadores habían esperado. Exploramos la forma en que los 
motivos generados por el sistema (e.g., alcanzar objetivos organizacionales específicos, prevenir 
sanciones u obtener recompensas) se acumulaban en contra de motivos generados de forma 
autónoma, intrínseca o de servicio. Usando datos cuantitativos y cualitativos, encontramos que para 
los maestros predominaba una constelación de motivos de servicio público: compromisos pro-
sociales, ideologías de justicia y equidad, creencia en la dignidad moral de los estudiantes 
desfavorecidos y una tendencia a la identificación con el trabajo propio como un “llamado” 
personal. En comparación, las recompensas monetarias fueron aceptadas como si los maestros ya las 
merecieran y ni las recompensas ni la rendición de cuentas parecían regular el comportamiento de 
forma profunda. El prestigio no fue derivado del desempeño formal dentro del sistema de 
incentivos, sino que fluyó del juicio comunicado por estudiantes, padres o colegas que tuvieron 
contacto directo con el trabajo de los docentes. 
Palabras-clave: motivación laboral;  auto-interés; ética de servicio; pago por desempeño; rendición 
de cuentas; desventaja social 
 
Motivação dos professores para trabalhar na era dos incentivos extrínsecos extrínsecos: 
Metas de desempenho e compromissos pró-sociais ao serviço da equidade  
Resumo: Ciente do declínio da prestação de contas e as provas decepcionante das avaliações 
dos sistemas de pagamento de desempenho nos EUA, nos perguntamos por que a gestão por 
incentivos extrínsecos e definir objetivos organizacionais tem sido menos potente o que os 
designers tinham antecipado. Nós explorar como os motivos gerados pelo sistema (por 
exemplo, alcançar os objetivos organizacionais específicos, evitar sanções ou obter 
recompensas) empilhadas contra razões autonomamente gerados, intrínseca ou serviço. Usando 
dados quantitativos e qualitativos, descobrimos que para os professores dominadas por uma 
constelação de razões de serviço público: compromissos pró-sociais, ideologias de justiça e 
equidade, crença na dignidade moral de estudantes desfavorecidos e uma tendência a 
identificação com o trabalho como uma "chamada de" pessoal. Em comparação, as 
recompensas monetárias foram aceitos como se os professores e recompensas merecidas e nem 
responsabilidade nem regular o comportamento parecia profundamente. O prestígio foi 
derivada há incentivos de desempenho formais dentro do sistema, mas fluiu a partir da 
declaração por alunos, pais ou colegas que tiveram contato direto com o julgamento trabalho 
dos professores. 
Palavras-chave: motivação de trabalho; auto-interesse; ética de serviço; pagamento por 
desempenho; rendição de contas; desvantagem social 
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Introduction  
 
At the end of the year 2015, after 14 years in existence, the federal No Child Left Behind 
accountability system became defunct in the United States. While the successor law, the Every Student 
Succeeds Act or ESSA (http://www.ed.gov/essa) retains some of the language of high stakes 
accountability applied to schools performing at the bottom 5%, we contend that the end of NCLB 
may mark the end of an era, an era during which the belief in the extraordinary power of extrinsic 
incentives, performance measurement, and organizational goal setting in managing educators’ work 
held sway, and during which these management tools have been a prime mechanism for improving 
schools serving marginalized students.  
Parallel to the end of NCLB, another plank of the incentive paradigm has become shaky. 
Thanks to consistent evaluations, funded by the U.S. federal government in parallel with Teacher 
Incentive Fund grants to a wide swath of educational jurisdictions across the country, we now have 
a corpus of research that fairly conclusively demonstrates the ineffectiveness of pay for performance 
as means to motivate improvements in teachers’ practices (Yuan et al., 2012). This is not to say that 
goal setting and extrinsic incentives, especially the NCLB sanctions regime, did not have an impact 
on the operation of schools and teachers’ work (see Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009, for a review). 
High stakes test scores rose substantially in many states, and pedagogy was adapted to the demands 
of the system. But neither did achievement gaps narrow in expected ways, nor did the systems, for 
the most part, motivate the expected upgrading of instructional practices in schools under pressure 
(Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Au, 2007; Diamond & Spillane, 2004; Mintrop, 2004; Valli & Buese, 2007). 
In this paper, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting 
may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had 
expected. Given our research design, our answers are partial. We draw them from a set of charter 
schools that, on the face of it, could have been considered fertile soil for extrinsic incentives. But we 
found, figuratively speaking, that incentives and organizational goals merely sent down shallow roots 
because, below the surface, they never found the nutrients in the deeper layers of diffuse work 
motivation and commitment without which they could not take off.  
There can be no question that educating students who have been consigned to the margins 
of American society requires motivation and effort that goes beyond what has to be expended in 
more secure middle class circumstances. Schools with large numbers of ethnically stratified low-
income or poor immigrant students face unique challenges not encountered in other settings. Social, 
economic, political, and cultural disadvantage and deprivation may make students’ connections to 
school and engagement in learning tentative (Bingham & Okagaki, 2012; Nasir, 2011), and grossly 
unequal distribution of resources within the educational system exacerbates these disadvantages. A 
distinct commitment on the part of educators to high achievement and success in the face of social 
adversities (Gu & Day, 2007) seems to be required.  
There are currently two motivational dynamics advocated by reformers of American schools 
that are to shore up this commitment. Roughly speaking, one dynamic draws from intrinsic service 
commitments, the other banks on extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting. This paper 
investigates the relationship between the two in a unique work environment: public charter schools 
with a distinct social justice orientation.  
 
Pro-social Commitment and Service 
 
According to Grant (2008, p. 49), pro-social motivation is the desire to expend effort to 
benefit other people. It manifests itself in empathy, helpfulness, and values of concern for others 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol.  25 No. 44  
(Batson, 1987). These dispositions may be relatively stable states and commitments (Shamir, 1990) 
or they may be activated in situations of contact with others who need help (Grant, 2007).  
Teachers in schools serving students living in challenging socio-economic circumstances may 
generate work motivation by developing a conscious appreciation of students’ needs and realities 
(Ladson-Billings, 2009), a strong ethic of care and service (Noddings, 1988; Talbert & McLaughlin, 
1994), a sense of duty to bring about high academic achievement in the face of obstacles, and a 
feeling of owning, or identifying with, their work (Gagné & Deci, 2005). It is often assumed in 
educational discourses that this kind of commitment is shorn up by ideals, values, meanings, and 
goals that make teaching more akin to a calling (Lortie, 1975; Rosso, Dekas, & Wrzesniewski, 2010; 
Shamir, 1991). We invoke a sense of calling when we refer to those who are highly motivated and 
committed to work with marginalized students as “dream keepers” (Ladson-Billings, 2009) or “social 
justice leaders” (Theoharis, 2007). Educators of this type exhibit an unwillingness to abandon their 
values or goals in the face of numerous distractions, obstacles, or challenges. Sometimes explicit 
ideologies around social justice or democratic citizenship may bolster these commitments 
(Westheimer, 1998).  
 
Self-Interest 
 
But teachers, like all employees, private or public, are also self-interested. As such, they may 
be concerned about workload, status or prestige, and monetary remuneration. Carrying out one’s 
work under difficult circumstances may heighten these concerns (Ingersoll, 2001). Extrinsic 
incentives tap into these sentiments. Growing out of the “new” public management (NPM) reforms 
of the 1980s and 90s that introduced private sector management principles into public services 
(Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt, 1990), goal setting and incentives 
have become pivotal motivational tools. In the incentive-driven dynamic, the combined power of 
quantitative quality indicators, performance measurement, evaluation, goal setting, rewards, 
sanctions, accountability, and market competition is to shore up work effort by mobilizing public 
employees’ self-interest in serving their clients well (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011).  
But self-interest can also play a less sanguine role as Lipsky (2010) in his analysis of street-
level bureaucrats has shown. This research shows how human-service workers, perennially battling a 
mismatch between client needs for care and lack of time and energy to satisfy these needs, cope with 
work load by rationing services, insulating themselves from personal closeness to clients, and 
excluding from consideration those deemed undeserving of their care due to lower social status or 
some presumed moral deficiency. “Deficit-thinking” (Valencia, 2012) props up service workers’ 
precarious status by devaluing vulnerable clients, with harmful consequences for teachers’ 
expectations for students (Weinstein, 2002).  
Extrinsic incentive and accountability systems, such as the NCLB design, are often explicitly 
designed to prevent these harmful consequences. Against deficit thinking they presumably marshal 
evidence by making the most effective solutions, organizations, or individual teachers visible and by 
creating a pragmatic can-do attitude (Skrla & Scheurich, 2003). Against the tendency of educators to 
doubt the deservingness of certain groups or categories, the system creates performance categories 
for the most disregarded groups and punishes neglect (Kim & Sunderman, 2005). Motivating 
educators in this dynamic would be a matter of commitment to organizational performance goals, 
extrinsic incentives, evaluation, and appeal to self-interest.  
 
Service and Self-Interest 
 
 Service and self-interest are not mutually exclusive. In the reality of work organizations, 
motivations and behaviors that benefit self and others occur simultaneously, but with varying 
weights. They can be synergistic, but also antagonistic (Grant, 2009). On one hand, organizations 
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can reward behavior or motives that benefit others (Bolino & Grant, 2016; Frey & Osterloh, 2002) 
and employees can internalize organizational goals (Gagné & Deci, 2005). On the other hand, 
organizations can raise the cost of service or pro-social behavior and compel employees or citizens 
to be primarily self-interested (Mansbridge, 1990), and extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic 
motives or pro-social commitments (Frey & Osterloh, 2002). We will discuss these dynamics 
further.  
 
Social-Justice Oriented Public Charter Schools    
 
In the era of extrinsic incentives, schools serving disadvantaged communities must find ways 
to accommodate the two motivational dynamics: one more service oriented, the other more self-
interested. The schools we investigate here are in the cross hairs of this tension. Located in poor 
inner city neighborhoods, the schools are independent public charter schools that were founded 
with an espoused social justice and progressive mission. We characterize the schools’ mission based 
on publicly available material and initial interviews with school leaders. From both sources we 
gleaned an explicit commitment to social justice and equity and a pedagogical vision that was 
student-centered and emphasized relevance for the students’ identity and culture. The three schools 
are similar in this respect. Later, we will see how this espoused mission finds a complement in 
teachers’ beliefs and dispositions.  
The schools owe their very existence as charter schools to the state laws that were passed in 
the wake of public management reform. As independent non-networked schools, they experience 
the full weight of accountability, managerial independence, and market competition. They exist 
under the watchful eye of the local school district with which they compete for students and which 
can make the re-authorization of their charter difficult. Up until the year 2013, their existence 
depended on performance in the state’s test-based and sanctions-driven accountability system that 
had been in existence for 13 years. A year prior to data collection, the schools also volunteered to 
participate in the federal Teacher Incentive Fund initiative that gave them additional funds to reward 
good performance with bonuses that could add up to about 20%of an average teacher salary. This 
required them to adopt an extensive performance management system for teachers consisting of 
standardized test scores, value-added measures, teaching evaluations scored by an external agency, 
and principal ratings of teachers’ progress.  
Teachers in these schools were non-tenured and non-unionized. Contract renewal from year 
to year depended on performance and was at the discretion of school administrators and governing 
boards. At the same time, the schools, to varying degrees, tended to recruit from a pool of young 
novice teachers who were perhaps drawn to the schools’ explicit social justice orientation (see 
Foote's [2009] anecdotal evidence), but pursued shifting career goals (Johnson, 2004). For teachers 
in this situation, the uncertainty of reward and employment presumably contrasted with the certainty 
of educational challenge, ordinarily encountered in schools educating students of the schools’ 
demographic profile.  
The TIF grant was overseen and in parts administered by a local provider organization for 
the three schools. The researchers contracted with this local provider as evaluators of the TIF grant. 
Though certain federal guidelines had to be followed for the evaluation, the provider did not 
interfere with the work of the researchers. Evaluation was only one aspect of the research. From the 
start, we also wanted to contribute to an understanding of teacher work motivation by training a 
fine-grained lens on motivation patterns under the dramatic circumstances of the three schools. On 
one hand, performance goals and extrinsic incentives are presumably pervasive and embraced by 
management in the three secondary schools, and teachers have few labor rights that could buffer 
their impact. On the other hand, the character of the communities the schools serve calls for an 
engaged moral stance against the adversities of marginalization and towards social justice, a moral 
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stance that is encouraged by the schools’ explicit philosophy. The study explores what motives 
prevail under these circumstances in the crucible of goals, incentives, service commitments, and 
teachers’ occupational identity. We use the literature on work motivation, teacher work motivation, 
and public service motivation to conceptualize the study. We describe participants, context, 
instruments, measures, and protocols for this mixed-methods study. Findings are drawn from 
analysis of qualitative and quantitative data (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004).  
 
Work Motivation Theories 
 
Work motivation has been conceptualized with various theories. We briefly discuss four 
main ones from which we derived the conceptual framework for this study: expectancy theory, goal 
setting theory, self-concept theory, and self-determination theory. In the literature on accountability 
and incentives in education (see literature cited in the next section), the use of expectancy and goal 
setting theories is frequent and standard. In expectancy theory, workers anticipate rewards and strive 
to attain the rewards when they expect that increased effort will result in the reward, called 
expectancy, and when the reward itself promises to fulfill a desired satisfaction, called valence 
(Lawler, 1973). Valence is of a different quality than values. Valence describes a temporary valuing 
attached to an action; a value, on the other hand, is, in a classic definition by Rokeach (1973, p. 5), 
“An enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or 
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence." As an 
example, substance abusers may have a high valence for the substance they are craving, but may not 
value, rather even detest, their craving.  
In goal setting theory, rewards are secondary. Goals themselves are the primary force. Goal 
setting theory holds that workers are more strongly motivated in pursuit of specific, worthwhile and 
attainable goals than in pursuit of “doing their best” (Locke & Latham, 1990). In either expectancy 
or goal setting models, it does not matter whether goals or rewards come from outside or inside the 
worker, but rewards or goals need to have valence and be sharp, distinct, or precise enough to be 
calculable. We posit, in line with previous theorizing (Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Kelley & Protsik, 
1997), that no performance accountability regime or pay-for-performance reward program can 
succeed unless teachers are orienting their work towards relatively precise goals that cut through goal 
ambiguities endemic in educational work.  
Self-concept theory or self-determination theory are less frequently used in research on work 
motivation in the nexus of externally generated organizational goals, rewards, and sanctions. But 
they are especially useful when one wants to understand the connection between the latter and 
motivation that springs from internally generated sources. In self-concept theory (Shamir, 1990, 
1991), the subjective or collectively shared meaningfulness of diffuse goals or aspirations is central. 
Motivational energy is generated within a dynamic of self-evaluation and dissonance between “Is” 
and “Ought,” one’s internalized values in reference to obligations of the collective and the realities 
of behavior or performance. Specific or precise goals play less of a role in this theory, and deeply 
internalized values are a premise. This theory may be especially applicable for education if we 
assume that educational work is strongly moral and embedded in institutional meanings and norms 
that have motivational power. But the theory gives us few tools to conceptualize the connection 
between these meanings and norms, on one hand, and something that may be external and extrinsic, 
such as organizational goals or monetary rewards. In self-determination theory, on the other hand, 
the process of internalization looms large. Human beings are seen as energized by psychological 
needs for competence, autonomy, and belonging. And workers are motivated by their work to the 
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degree that they are able to fulfill these needs. Calculative orientations towards precise goals, 
personal or organizational, are enmeshed in more diffuse internal flows of energy. External 
organizational goals, expectations, standards, or incentives may be integrated into these internal 
flows to the degree that they enhance individuals’ sense of competence, autonomy, and belonging 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Weinstein, 2009), or prevent their diminishment.  
Self-determination theory arrays work motives on an internalization continuum from being 
more externally to being more internally regulated (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Clearly, in work we are 
exposed to external regulations, no matter what. For most of us, earning a wage is an 
incontrovertible contingency in order to fulfill needs and desires outside of work. We might accept 
an external regulation as necessary even though we do not particularly value it. If society wants to 
examine students on standardized tests, it is something we do as educators whether we think it 
makes sense or not. We would not be doing our duty in our own eyes and the eyes of others, given 
that students need to succeed by the standards of society, not our own as educators. In the 
terminology of self-determination theory, we “introject” this regulation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
Failing to act on introjected expectations may generate feelings of shame.  
A deeper form of internalization is identification or integration. Regulations that we have 
integrated have become part of us. They make up our identity as workers. They motivate 
autonomous and discretionary action. They radiate out to a larger complex of values, standards of 
quality, and practices that are meaningful to us. We have integrated standardized tests if we observe 
ourselves in our work through them in conjunction with other criteria of good practice. And if we 
could connect monetary rewards for high scores to a job well done by these formal and informal 
criteria, we may have integrated pay for performance as well. In this case, goals are expressions of 
more diffuse values (Locke & Latham, 1990), and rewards may be perceived as internally meaningful 
symbols of achievement (Harackiewicz & Sansone, 2000).  
Research on public service motivation (PSM) specifically looks at the interaction between 
goals and incentives, on one hand, and service commitment, on the other (Grant, 2008, 2009;  Perry, 
1996; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Perry & Wise, 1990; Wright, 2001). In Perry’s foundational 
formulation (1996), originally set out to identify work motives unique to public sector workers, 
motives such as compassion, civic duty, public interest, pro-social commitments to the benefit of 
others, or self-sacrifice were seen as a counterpoint to the increasingly dominant emphasis on 
extrinsic reward calculation with career, status, or money. Researchers found distinctive differences 
in value orientations between private and public employees, for example lesser value placed on 
financial rewards than helping others (Boyne, 2002; Crewson, 1997; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007). As 
the field matured, more encompassing theoretical models were developed that explain public service 
motivation as a function of values and goals (Grant, 2008, 2009; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008).  
In public service motivation research, goals are discussed in various ways. As we discussed 
earlier, those who stress goal ambiguity as an ingrained feature of public service work search for 
more diffuse commitments as main motivators. In Wright’s (2001, 2004, 2007) PSM models, on the 
other hand, goal setting is in the center. In his path models, the public service mission of the agency 
and its incentives and rewards, in combination with employees’ values, produce a sense of overall job 
importance and commitment to organizational goals. Organizational goals, with their specific, 
attainable, and challenging characteristics, come to regulate work. Goals are central motivators. They 
are reinforced and aided by organizational mission and personal values.  
It is conceivable that when goals are perceived as highly ambiguous, diffuse service 
commitments fill in as motives, or compensate for, the weakness of precise goal setting. This pattern 
seems intuitive for education, especially when social environments are volatile and learning 
outcomes unpredictable, as may be the case for challenging educational environments. But the 
reverse is also possible: the degree to which specific goals are adopted or available in the 
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organizational context may reinforce public service commitments (Grant, 2008; Jung & Rainey, 
2011). Taking its cues from research on public service motivation, the purpose of the current study 
is to shed light on the connection between rewards, goals, values, and service commitments in an 
educational setting that is organized as a hybrid between managerialist orientations towards 
performance and social justice commitments.  
 
Research on Teacher Work Motivation  
 
In the literature on teacher work motivation, beginning with Lorie (1975), work motivation 
is often broadly conceptualized in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic motives.  In the seventies, eighties 
and early nineties, with scholarship by Lortie (1975),  Johnson, (1986), Mitchell, Ortiz, and Mitchell 
(1987), Nias (1989), or Firestone & Pennell (1993), the view prevails that teachers are primarily 
intrinsically motivated. Echoing this line of scholarship, Mitchell, Ortiz, and Mitchell (1987) 
summarize the evidence this way: “All available evidence supports two basic conclusions regarding 
the value or potency of various rewards for educators. First educators generally find intrinsic 
rewards more meaningful and attractive than extrinsic ones. […] The second broadly supported 
conclusion is that educators rely on sharply divergent subjective meaning systems for interpreting 
their work responsibilities and experiences” (p. 188). Thus, work motives are seen as largely internal, 
culturally and self-determined.  
This prevailing view in the literature (see for exceptions Miskel et al. 1980) changes in the 
nineties when teacher motivation is examined in the context of strong, sharp, and high-stakes 
incentive systems (Kreps, 1997) based, for example, on accountability or pay for performance  
(Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Elmore, 2004; Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Firestone & Pennell, 1993; Kelley, 
Heneman, & Milanowski, 2002; Kelley & Protsik, 1997; Leithwood, Steinbach, & Jantzi, 2002; 
Malen, 1999; Marsh et al., 2011; Milanowski, 2000;  Mintrop, 2004; Odden & Kelley, 2001; Supovitz, 
2009; Yuan et al., 2012). This body of literature suggests that incentives and goal setting can become 
motivational forces. But when they do, what happens to intrinsic motives? Are they juxtaposed, 
reduced in strength, or submerged by newer more rational and self-interested calculations?  
At a time in the late 1990s, when “probation” was still a novel shock to the system, Mintrop    
(2004), using expectancy and self-concept theories, found that various patterns existed side by side. 
Teachers in his study tended to disregard targets and sanctions as motivators and instead interpreted 
them as further signs of unfairness and injustice leveled at schools serving the neediest students. The 
schools he studied were for the most part located in poor African-American neighborhoods. Rather 
than compelling new work effort, the threat of sanctions transformed into more energetic pleas for 
help. Highly engaged teachers were especially critical of new extrinsic incentives and found little 
educational meaning in accountability goals, yet were also more inclined to worry about prestige, 
reputation, and autonomy. They were therefore willing to do what needed to be done to “keep the 
state off [their] backs.” So were the principals. In hindsight, this pattern seems to mark a transition 
from traditional assumptions of service to new ones associated with accountability.  
Finnigan & Gross (2007) studied Chicago public schools serving similar demographics, 
several years after Mintrop’s study. Using expectancy and incentive theories as their conceptual 
framework, they found that extrinsic incentives did compel teachers to attach valence to 
organizational goals and expend effort. After an initial upsurge of motivational energy, however, 
demoralization spread in schools where targets could not be met in short order and effort did not 
seem to prevent sanctions. The researchers speculated that this sort of demoralization hinted at 
motivational dynamics not adequately captured by expectancy logics. According to Frey & Osterloh 
(2001), demoralization can be interpreted as a typical symptom of intrinsic motivation being 
crowded out by extrinsic motives. “Crowding-out” does not mean that intrinsic or extrinsic work 
motives are mutually exclusive (see a discussion in Supovitz, 2009), but that at a certain point the 
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strength of one can diminish or overpower the other. Alternatively, the new extrinsic motives could 
become synergistic with (Milanowski, 2000; Supovitz, 2009), or perhaps internalized into (Skrla & 
Scheurich, 2003) traditional intrinsic service commitments.  
We explore these connections by examining the interplay of four main sources of work 
motivation: precise goal setting, diffuse pro-social or service commitments, different degrees of 
identification with one’s work, and material benefits or status.  
 
 
                                       Figure 1. Conceptual Model  
 
These four motivational forces are embedded in the specific charter school setting that in 
turn is fundamentally shaped by the experience of social adversity and deprivation, given the specific 
student populations the schools serve, and the potentially trenchant effect of the performance 
management regime along neo-liberal public management or managerialist lines that the schools 
labor under or voluntarily adopted.  
 
Cases 
 
 The data on which this paper reports were collected in the first two years of a four-year 
longitudinal study of the responses of three publicly funded charter schools to a new bonus pay 
system. The three schools are relatively small in size (see Table 1). The schools are secondary 
schools and urban in character. They are located in distinctly poor sections of a metropolitan area in 
the state of California. As was mentioned, the schools are similar in their espoused mission of social 
justice, equity, and progressive pedagogy. Helping disadvantaged students gain college access is a 
shared orientation as well. But they also differ in some characteristic ways. Apart from differing size 
and measured performance (see below), School B, the smallest of the three schools, specializes in 
helping students who have not been successful in regular district schools. Social-emotional support 
for students in a small ‘family’ atmosphere is valued greatly. School A sees itself as a community-
based school, guided by a philosophy of critical pedagogy and engaged citizenship. School C is a 
much larger school than A and B. It houses both an elementary school and a middle and high 
school. Only the middle and high school is considered in this paper. Equity and social justice are 
paired with a strong and explicit emphasis on academics.  
Within the state accountability system, now defunct, School C performed strongly for its 
demographic profile. Schools A and B, on the other hand, were poor performers by state standards. 
None of the three schools met their growth targets in the school years during which data for this 
paper were collected.  
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Table 1  
Demographics and Performance 2012 
 
 
School A School B School C 
API 2011-12 Growth Target points 
 
12 C 5 
API 2011-12 Growth 
 
-13 C -29 
Enrollment 
 
176 85 178* 
 Black or African American (%) 
 
4.0% 12.9% 13.5% 
 Hispanic or Latino (%) 
 
55.7% 72.9% 80.3% 
 White (%) 
 
9.1% 5.9% 1.7% 
 Socioeconomically Disadvantaged (%) 
 
58.5% 89.4% 87.1% 
 English Learners (%) 
 
84.7% 69.4% 40.4% 
 Students with Disabilities (%) 5.1% 4.7% 11.8% 
 
Note: C means the school had significant demographic changes and will not have any growth or target information. 
* School C enrollment in secondary school grades 
 
The 48 teachers included in our sample are middle or high-school teachers. From the 35 
teachers that responded to the survey, we glean the characteristics displayed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2  
Characteristics of Responding Teachers 
 
 
School A School B School C 
Years teaching (average) 
 
6.3 5.2 7.5 
Years teaching at current school (average) 
 
2.4 4.4 3.9 
 Fully certified teachers 
 
73% 67% 83% 
Working at least 7 hours beyond contract 
 
82% 83% 88% 
Expecting to stay in their current school for at least 3 years 63% 16%* 67% 
    
* See below in text 
 
Average tenure at the schools at the time the survey was conducted was fairly short (3.5 
years) and commitment to stay was tenuous, confirming the expectation of shifting career goals. 
About one-third of teachers in two schools and more than two-thirds in one school expected to 
leave within three years. Of the three schools, School C is most stable. It has less teacher turn-over, 
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a strong reputation in the community and many more student applicants than admission slots. 
Admissions were handled with a lottery system. School B was the least stable. It is a very small 
school and at the time of data collection several highly engaged teachers were considering new 
personal career moves that were not related to the conditions in the school.  
Thus, compared to a typical public school work environment, work motivation in the three 
schools may be influenced by relative job insecurity, accountability pressures, performance 
management, and a relatively short expected tenure on the part of relatively novice teachers. In the 
findings sections, we explore in more detail how the schools’ organizational characteristics may have 
influenced teacher motivation patterns.  
 
Methods and Data 
 
 The study is a mixed methods study of the three schools and the individuals working in 
them (Creswell, 2013). In particular, we selected a qualitative dominant mixed method approach, 
which relies in large part on qualitative data to understand relationships among factors, 
complemented by quantitative data to augment rough quantifications (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & 
Turner, 2007). We aimed at both the precise identification of different sources of motivation as well 
as a deeper understanding of how teachers allow for those motives in their work lives. Towards 
these ends, we administered a questionnaire to all teachers in the three schools and delved more 
deeply into work motives during four rounds of interviews conducted over a period of two years. 
 
Quantitative Data 
 
A teacher questionnaire was administered to 48 teachers in the three small high schools 
during the Spring of 2012. With a response rate of 73%, 35 teachers returned completed 
questionnaires. The questionnaire contains 256 items. For this paper, we report on a subset of data 
extracted from 88 items that directly pertain to teacher motivation and commitment, goal setting, 
rewards, and organizational culture and leadership. Other items capture perceptions of the details of 
the TIF performance management system and professional development dynamics that are the topic 
of other papers. Wherever possible, we used items and scales that have previously shown good 
psychometric properties, are widely used in the field, or were created in previous research by the first 
author. Constructs represented by the scales were tested for internal consistency for this small 
sample with Cronbach's alpha. Scales with a coefficient over 0.75 were eligible for analysis, with the 
exception of the two-item scale “goal clarity” for which we could not achieve better consistency 
with more items. Most items and scales are constructed in a 5-point Likert scale format with the 
scale mid-point defined as neutral.  
We use the Work Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale (WEIMS) to explore work 
motives. The instrument was developed within self-determination theory (Tremblay, Blanchard, 
Taylor, Pelletier, & Villeneuve, 2009). The WEIMS asks respondents why they do their work and 
arrays motives on a continuum from most externally regulated to most internally regulated. At the 
internal end of the continuum, we find intrinsic motivation (i.e. satisfaction and pleasure with the 
work itself) and integrated regulation (i.e. identification with, and ownership of the work).1 Moving 
to the external end of the continuum, we find introjected regulation (i.e. duty generated by guilt or 
shame) and external regulation (i.e. garnering an income or monetary rewards).  
We added a scale that specifically captures broader ideals encapsulated in pro-social 
commitment to others and the common good (Grant, 2009).2 These kinds of commitments can be 
                                                 
1 We deleted a third one “identified regulation” that is part of the WEIMS. 
2 We changed the format of Grant’s pro-social motivation scale to create consistency with the WEIMS.  
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more externally (duty) or internally (identity) motivated (Grant, 2009). We further added a scale 
developed in the first author’s previous research that captures the concern for external validation 
(i.e. prestige, reputation, standing, and professional pride in the eyes of evaluating or auditing 
authorities) which can be either externally or internally regulated (Buunk et al., 2005). Thus, the 
spectrum of diffuse work motives gives us a range: material interests, status, duty, identification with 
work or ownership, work-inherent pleasure, and service to others or the common good.  
Task-specific motives are captured with goal-related scales. Three scales, specificity, difficulty 
(Wright, 2004), and commitment (Hollenbeck et el. 1989) inquire about the degree to which 
respondents adopt or embrace specific and challenging goals. Lastly, to capture baseline attitudes 
toward extrinsic incentives we used a scale and a set of items developed by Ballou & Podgursky, 
(1993) that explores respondents’ acceptance of the idea of bonus pay for differential performance.  
Quantitative data are analyzed with univariate and bivariate statistics. In this paper we 
present frequencies (scale means) and, on occasion, correlations (Pearson’s r) that appear solid given 
the small sample size. Again, the purpose of the quantitative analysis is limited: to understand the 
broad quantitative contours of patterns that rest on further exploration with more qualitative detail. 
In the quantitative portion on teacher motivation patterns, we did not find distinct school 
differences (see below in the findings section). Given the small sample size, we therefore treat 
respondents from the three schools as one universe.  
 
Qualitative Data   
 
We conducted several rounds of semi-structured interviews with teachers across the three 
schools. The interview method allows to access the subjective perspective of individuals and inquire 
into the categories by which they observe their experiences, world-views, and motivations (Patton, 
1990; Weiss, 1995). Across the three schools we selected 33 teachers. In the two smaller schools, we 
interviewed almost all teachers. In the larger school (C), we interviewed almost two-thirds of the 
teachers, with an emphasis on teachers teaching academic subjects (Math, Science, English, and 
Social Studies).  
 
Table 3  
Interviewed Teachers 
 
 
Total teachers Selection 
School A 
 
15 10 
School B 
 
8 8 
School C 
 
25 15 
Total 48 33 
 
For this paper, we analyzed data from four rounds of interviews collected through the 2011-
2012 and 2012-2013 schools years. Each round of interviews informed the successive one. Through 
each round we expanded our understanding of the motivational dynamic among teachers, which 
allowed us to refine our instruments. Most explicitly, issues of work motivation were addressed in 
the first, second, and fourth rounds. The results of the survey conducted in the spring of 2012 were 
used for the development of the instrument for round 4. In the first round conducted in Fall 2011, 
we broadly inquired about teaching philosophy, school mission and culture, and overall diffuse pro-
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social motivation and commitment. In the second one, we went more deeply into the tensions 
between moral commitments/ pro-social motives and extrinsic incentives. In the third round, we 
interviewed teachers about their ways of learning about instruction. Although this round did not 
explicitly address teacher motivation in the protocol, relevant information on motivation was 
nevertheless obtained. Finally in round 4, we were ready to develop an interview guide that explored 
the finer interactions between service commitments, pro-social motivation, goal setting, and intrinsic 
and extrinsic motives, bringing together all relevant topics of inquiry. In total, we conducted 56 
interviews, lasting between 25 and 60 minutes. Thirteen teachers were interviewed more than once. 
Table 3 summarizes the interviews collected organized by schools and round of data collection.  
 
Table 4  
Summary of Interviews per School and Survey 
Rounds of teachers interviews 
 
School year School A School B School C Total 
1. Teaching philosophy, school culture, 
commitments 
 
2010-11 4 3 6 13 
2. Interaction pro-social versus pay for 
performance 
 
2011-12 2 1 5 8 
3. Teacher learning  
 
2011-12 3 - 6 9 
4. Comprehensive motivational patterns 
 
2012-13 4 8 7 19 
Total 
                                                    
   
56 
 
Codes for analysis were developed along the dimensions of the conceptual model (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013). Initially, we developed seven distinct theory-guided codes. Additional 
codes emerged from the data, most notably the code of “deservingness” and the distinctions 
between various objects of commitment as well as more detailed aspects of goal setting. The codes 
are listed and further described in Table 5. Interviews were coded using a qualitative data analysis 
software (Dedoose). We defined, operationalized, and illustrated the codes with representative 
quotes from interviews..  We analyzed qualitative data in three rounds: (1) we ascertained the 
concrete meanings that interviewees attach to pro-social commitments, pleasure, duty, goals, 
prestige, and rewards, etc. in contradistinction to other concepts; (2) cross-referenced these 
meanings to search for overlap, tension, contradiction, or synergy; (3) looked for patterned 
differences across various organizational and individual teachers’ profiles.  
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Table 5  
Analytical Codes 
Motive  
 
Description 
Pro-social or service 
commitment  
Values, ideals, or principles that inspire working in favor of 
students’ welfare, building a better society, or working at this 
challenging school. 
 
Ownership Aspects of teachers’ work that have become part of one’s person 
or that have fused with workers’ inner aims or who they are.  
 
Pleasure Work energy propelled by people’s interest in the activity or task 
itself.  
 
Duty Obligations derived from external sources. Duties are carried out 
irrespective of needs fulfillment (pleasure) or self-interest. They 
appeal to internal values or goals, but are clearly seen as external to 
oneself. Organizational goals can be one source of duties, more 
diffuse institutional obligations and responsibilities are another 
source.  
     
Goal Orientations that direct or concentrate work effort.  These 
orientations can take the shape of specific goals, objectives, or 
broader purposes. They can originate from outside the worker, i.e. 
be externally regulated, in the form of organizational expectations 
or system demands, or from inside the worker, i.e. be internally 
regulated. There are learning or performance goals. Goals can 
have different degrees of precision. 
 
Prestige Sense of status or self-worth based on the perceptions of others. 
Prestige can be derived from material goods, symbols, or moral 
esteem. 
 
Money  Motives that are connected to material benefits. The work is 
performed to attain the desired reward derived from the activity.  
 
 
After analyzing quantitative and qualitative data, we analyzed school specific patterns and 
individual cases, looking for organizational or individual variation. For the quantitative part of this 
analysis, we relied on radar charts as a way to illustrate and analyze motivational profiles. The radar 
chart is a graphical method that allows displaying multiple variables in a simultaneous fashion in a 
two-dimensional representation. This analysis proceeded as follows. First, based on the quantitative 
data, we created 35 radar charts based on the motivation scales from the survey. Second, based on 
the means, we identified a modal pattern for the entire sample. Third, with the purpose of looking 
for differences between schools, we clustered individual profiles by school and contrasted them with 
the modal pattern. We did not find identifiable patterns that clearly differed across organizations. 
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Fourth, taking the modal pattern as a point of reference, we identified differences among individual 
profiles. We clustered individual cases into three categories: modal, more pragmatic, and more 
idealistic. More ‘pragmatic’ teachers showed a higher orientation towards goal-setting motives and 
less emphasis on pro-social commitment or pleasure. More ‘idealistic’ teachers showed a lower 
orientation towards goal-setting but a heightened importance of pro-social commitments, 
identification with work, and pleasure.  From these two clusters, we selected two prototypical cases 
that illustrate differences quite well. For each of these two in-depth cases, we developed a narrative 
that draws from all available data we had from these individuals up to the end of the fourth round of 
data collection.  
 
Findings 
 
We begin the report of findings with a display of the relative strength of the various motives 
under investigation indicated by scale means. The scales are derived from self-determination and 
goal setting theories. In 2012, when these data were collected, test-based accountability had been 
established for 13 years in the state, and federal No Child Left Behind demographic subgroup 
calculations had been in existence for over ten years. Also, a relatively generous pay for performance 
scheme had been adopted in the previous year. It stood to reason that this should have left a strong 
mark on teachers’ work motives, reinforcing the relative importance of specific goals and externally 
regulated performance expectations and duties relative to more internal or self-adopted motives. The 
quantitative data show that this was not the case.  
 
Figure 2. Strength of Work Motives 
*=Number of cases (n) 
 
Figure 2 compares the relative strengths of an array of work motives. Expressed in scale 
means, teachers in the three-school sample named as their main motivations pro-social 
commitments, feelings of identification with or ownership of the work, intrinsic pleasure associated 
with the work, and the difficulty and challenges their work poses to them.  Specific goals were found 
in the neutral range. Sense of duty, concern for prestige, and garnering material benefits ranked 
1.00
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2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
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4.50
5.00 4.62 (33*) 4.42 (35)
3.83 (35) 3.77 (35)
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2.89 (34) 2.83 (35)
1.97 (35)
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lowest with means below the neutral mark. Thus, in reference to the literature on teacher work 
motivation, teachers on the average in the three-school sample appear to be rather traditional: driven 
by broad pro-social commitments, a sense of identification with one’s work, and work-inherent 
“psychic rewards” (Lortie, 1975) while acknowledging the enormous challenges that their work 
poses to them. By comparison, specific goals and commitment to organizational goals receive mean 
ratings of less than moderate strength.  
Material incentives were perceived as a very weak or negligible force for work motivation, 
with mean ratings close to a rating of 1 (not at all a reason for one’s work motivation). But this 
contrasts with the finding that 69% of respondents found the idea of monetary bonuses for better 
performance acceptable. School-wide bonuses were considered acceptable by an overwhelming 83% 
of respondents. There seems to be a gap between being open to receiving money and being 
regulated by it in one’s work.  
It is quite conceivable that the self-reported means across the array of motives captured by 
the WEIMS and other scales reflect desired ideologies, rather than a true motivational pattern. As  
Dan Lortie (1975) already noted, traditional occupational ideologies of teachers in the United States 
have tended to privilege moral purposes over material gain, so the quantitative data need to be 
triangulated with qualitative data that prompt and challenge teachers to explain how in their minds 
the various motives interact with each other.  
Mirroring quantitative scales, qualitative codes were developed in four main complexes: 
service and pro-social commitments, degree of identification with the work, goal setting, and reward 
related to material benefits and status. Codes related to service or pro-social commitments and 
identification with work refer to self-determination and self-concept theories as previously 
discussed. Codes related to goal setting and reward refer to goal setting and expectancy theories.  
Given the nature of the interview material, the complex of service and pro-social commitment was 
subdivided into commitment to students, society, and school. As was described in the section on 
methods, the code of deservingness was developed from the material. It captured the many statements 
that explicitly stressed the moral worthiness of students in contradistinction to a society that seems 
to value them less. The complex identification with work followed the distinctions of pleasure, 
ownership, and duty. Given the diffuse nature of narratives related to goals, we first captured the 
complex of goal setting with a broad code of “goals” which we subsequently subdivided into various 
kinds of goals and the commitments that interviewees attach to them. Following goal setting theory 
and public service motivation studies, we coded goals according to their degree of specificity or 
precision versus diffuseness, as well as the degree to which organizational goals and personal goals 
overlapped.  
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Table 6  
Meta-Matrix for Main Codes 
Motivation  
 
Description Quote examples 
Commitment 
to students 
I work for them [students]. 
Inspired by helping a diverse student population.. 
Committed to struggling students. 
Committed to empower students. 
Rewarded by student progress, overcoming obstacles, and 
success. 
Believing in students, high expectations. 
 
 “To me I feel a stronger sense of commitment to are these 
people going to be critical thinkers and engaged in the 
world?  Do they see themselves as empowered?  So for me 
student empowerment is the most important which I do 
think that knowing more content is empowering”. (School 
C, 23)  
Commitment 
to society 
 
Concerns about unfairness and inequity. 
Desire to help people to make it in life. 
Build a more inclusive society. 
Wanting to make a difference in society.  
Caring about social justice. 
 
 “I think a lot of times these days we call, like we say oh 
well, you know, I care about social justice.” (School C, 17) 
Commitment 
to the school 
Attracted to schools that serve a diverse population. 
Want to work with a population of students in need. 
Appreciate to be part of a team where we make kids achieve. 
Value the autonomy that the school provides me. 
“I value the opportunity to work with people who had 
historically negative school experiences.  And I also think 
that because we're not a district school, we have a lot of 
freedom to dictate how we want our culture to be or how 
we want to do things differently.” (School B, 6) 
 
Deservingness Desire to give students a second chance. 
Offer opportunities that should be there for them. 
Wan to do a good job simply because they deserve it. 
“I want to do a good job because I feel like the kids 
deserve that.  And I always want to be at my best because I 
think the kids need that and deserve that.” (School B, 2) 
 
Ownership Work is part of my personality; it is part of who I am. 
Teaching feels as a vocation, as a calling. 
I always want to improve; I want to grow for myself. 
“I don’t know, when something calls you like that I don’t 
know that you can always have a why, like I would call it a 
calling.  So I could say because it felt like a magnet pulling 
me to it, so that’s like feeling fulfilled.” (School B, 1)  
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Table 6 cont. 
Meta-Matrix for Main Codes  
Pleasure Feeling love and satisfaction for teaching. 
Work is challenging and interesting. 
Stimulates intellectual curiosity and desire to learn. 
Building relationships with students. 
“It’s like falling in love like I feel like I can’t satisfy this 
part of myself that loves doing what I do with anything 
else in life even if I was making a ton of money or 
whatever.  I get such satisfaction and joy from this work.” 
(School B, 9) 
 
Duty Feeling responsibility for and discomfort about the disparity.  
Kids, and their needs, bring me to work even when I feel 
tired. 
Committed not to abandon them (as other adults would).   
 “I mean I think we just have a responsibility to equalize 
that.  And I think when I think about my initial curiosity 
and sense of guilt and just discomfort with the disparity.” 
(School C, 22) 
 
Goal I want my students get to college/get integrated in society. 
I want my students become better writers/readers. 
I want my students to learn the content of the unit/develop a 
particular skill. 
I want for myself to develop a particular skill in my teaching 
this year. 
I set goals with my coach in the beginning of the year for my 
teaching. 
 
“Yes, college readiness is a big goal of mine.  And 
complex literacy and emotional intelligence, those are my 
personal goals.” (School B, 5) 
 
Prestige I want to be seen as good. 
I want that my students see me that I work hard for them. 
I want to be seen as a hard worker and willing to try new 
things by colleagues/supervisor. 
It does not matter to be recognized by society. 
 
“I would like to be recognized as someone who is good at 
what he does by my peers and colleagues. […] I feel like I 
am a person that works very hard at what he does. I like 
being recognized for working hard.” (School B, 3) 
 
Money  Receiving extra money is welcome. 
We are better off with extra money. 
Money does not motivate working hard or improving. 
Monetary rewards should be there to recognize the current 
effort.  
 “Obviously money is not the motivator of why I do what 
I’m doing, but it certainly would be nice to be recognized 
for my consistent work. ” (School C, 9) 
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Pro-social and Service Commitments 
 
“I want to help” was the most frequent reason given by teachers when they were asked why 
they came to work every day. In almost every interview, teachers expressed a high awareness of their 
students’ living circumstances or social position. They saw their students as in need, underserved, 
diverse, and “without enough adult support.” They described them as low-income, second language 
learners, who have had negative school experiences, who have struggled with school, and are in 
danger of dropping out. These descriptions attach themselves to intense feelings: 
It makes me feel even more motivated as a teacher knowing that I’m serving students 
who would not be getting as many adults who believe in them as they do here.  I love 
it.  I don’t want to work in any other environment.  I love it. (School B, 9)  
 
You can’t succeed in a population like this without empathy, without love. (School A, 
9)  
 
We’re seeing all of the breakdown of some of these problems in our country in front 
of us.  I love it.  I love helping people help themselves.  I love the challenge of what 
many different persons may bring. (School C, 1)  
 
While difficulty was taken for granted, the majority of educators chose voluntarily “to work with this 
student population.” In their eyes, this work could only be carried out by a “special person,” with 
particular sensitivity, who “knows how to relate with students and parents” and is strong enough not 
to give up: 
It takes, like, a special person to, like, teach like at our types of schools.  Like, you 
have to, like, be strong.  And I was, like, whoa, and so it gets me a little emotional 
because I thought about it and I was, like, you know what, like, people can easily give 
up working with, like, our youth, you know.  And so a part of me was, like, you 
know what – I do belong here and it’s a challenge and I love it and I want to come 
back. (School B, 8)  
 
Though challenges were daunting, it was also “inspiring” to “make a difference in students’ lives:”   
My inspiration has always been to work for, with students who don’t have that 
support somewhere else, who don’t have someone at home necessarily who is 
pushing them and who even knows how to prepare them for the future (School C, 
17)  
 
In the face of adversity, interviewees intended to give students “an alternative”, a “second chance,” 
and “a caring relationship that pushes them to meet the standards.” They voiced a sense of 
responsibility to do a good job and to teach good lessons. They felt rewarded when students 
overcome adversity, make progress, learn, grow, or accomplish to get into college. These rewards 
were called up when the work would get frustrating, something that was also on teachers’ minds.  
 Commitment to students and commitment to society flowed from a similar root sentiment: 
disapproval of inequality, injustice, and educational disadvantage associated with American society. 
“Social change” was a central idea in the interviews, and teaching “underserved students” was the 
contribution. Teachers insisted that their students were as deserving as students in wealthy areas: 
You know, there’s no reason why our kids shouldn’t have the same opportunities as 
a kid in [a nearby wealthy district].  It doesn’t really matter what home they were 
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born into; they should have the same opportunity.  So, we wanna give them that 
chance. (School C, 32)  
 
Thus, service to students and society was imbued with a distinct commitment to leveling the playing 
field, to restore the moral deservingness of underserved poor students and to offer them an 
education that was as good as that of more advantaged students. It is not surprising in light of this 
interview material that challenge and pro-social commitments were rated so prominently on the 
survey (see figure 2).  
 
Identification with Work 
 
 In self-determination theory, workers who identify with their work may express that the 
work is part of who they are or that the work is fused with a sense of identity. This sense of identity 
could be related to a number of supporting motives: the results of the work could be socially 
meaningful, the work itself could be pleasurable, stimulating, and suited to the person, identification 
with the work could be related to a sense of guilt associated with duty or external obligation, or the 
recognition and social status one derives from the work could constitute an important part of a 
person’s identity. In this section we examine the relationship among these motives which can be 
distinct, but also overlap. (Rewards and status are examined in a separate section further below).  
“Oh, I love it!  This is my favorite thing to do.” This was one of the most common replies 
when teachers were asked to describe their work. Most interviewees characterized their work as 
challenging but also interesting. They liked preparing lessons, developing curriculum, thinking about 
how students learn, learning new ways of teaching, or seeing students learn and grow. They 
described classroom interactions as joyful and uncertain at the same time. They saw teenagers as 
“fun people” who “make them laugh” and “bring mystery to the classroom” everyday. They enjoyed 
creating relationships with students, some of them lasting even past graduation.  
A high proportion of teachers in the three charter schools described teaching as a part of 
who they are, something that naturally flowed from them, an intrinsic desire to share, a vocation. In 
the following quote, a teacher vividly communicates how joy, stimulation, identification, and moral 
purpose intertwine to motivate her to be a teacher:  
I don’t know, when something calls you like that, I don’t know that you can always 
have a why, like I would call it a calling.  So I could say because it felt like a magnet 
pulling me to it, so that’s like feeling fulfilled.  It was interesting, every day’s 
different. You get to build relationships, it’s challenging, and it feels also like doing 
something good in the world.  Like creating more balance or more justice where 
there have been imbalances.  But I feel, like, on the deepest levels it was just what my 
heart wanted to do. (School B, 1)  
 
Quantitatively, identification with work is strongly associated with pro-social and service 
commitments. In survey data from the three schools, pro-social commitments were strongly and 
significantly correlated with ownership, or self-identification with work (.76), less so with pleasure 
and duty, and not at all with material reward. Speaking with self-determination theory, pro-social 
commitments to students and the common good can be considered largely internalized, i.e. sensed 
as something that is part of oneself.  
But feelings of guilt and the resulting sense of obligation or duty are blended in as well. 
Some interviewees saw themselves in a more privileged position relative to their poor and immigrant 
students of color, and this sometimes generated guilt. A teacher in School C expressed the mélange 
of feelings this way:  
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I mean I think we just have a responsibility to equalize […] When I think about my 
initial curiosity and sense of guilt and just discomfort with the disparity.  This feels 
like a way to kind of put that into practice, rather than just kind of looking from – I 
could stand over there and say, “Wow, it’s really too bad that those brown children 
don’t get the education they deserve,” but this feels a little bit more authentic and 
honest to say, “Yup, they don’t get the education they deserve.  Let me try and do at 
least my little piece to address that.” And I do think I have a different relationship 
with teaching, having come up through that lens as a teacher than I would have if I 
had stayed in rural Massachusetts and taught people who looked like me and were 
from middle class families. So I’m happy for it. (School C, 22)  
 
But this sort of happiness, composed of identity, service, pleasure, and duty went hand in hand with 
a sense that the work was indeed very hard and not always satisfying. In the interviews the work is 
also associated with feelings of being overwhelmed by the difficulties of the job, being underpaid, 
being under pressure, not getting enough support, being overlooked, and being “frustrated.” At first 
sight, these frustrations may seem to contradict the intrinsic love for the work itself. But in the face 
of these difficulties, the mostly young teaching force expressed that they were “challenged but loving 
it;” that they were “passionate to learn” to try new things and to improve their practice.  
 
Goal Setting 
 
In examining goals, we are interested in finding out how teachers make sense of their goals 
in the midst of goal ambiguity and goal uncertainty that are characteristic for teachers’ work in 
general. Organizational performance goals enshrined in features such as standardized tests, 
accountability targets, teaching evaluation scores, etc. presumably help reduce this goal ambiguity 
and concentrate teachers’ efforts. Following goal setting theory, we wanted to know if teachers 
pursued a relatively limited set of goals that help them prioritize, to what degree these goals are 
precise and specific, and to what degree they are informed by organizational goals or goals which are 
espoused by the performance management system. Following self-determination theory, we wanted 
to know if externally generated organizational goals were internalized, i.e. had become important 
personal goals used to orient action.  
Quantitatively, the strength of motives in Figure 2 showed that the high ratings for pro-
social commitments were only rivaled by the high ratings for work challenge, i.e. the perception that 
work objectives are quite demanding and require a high degree of skill and knowledge. By contrast, 
perceptions of goal clarity or specificity, i.e. knowing with precision what needs to be done, and 
sensing that job responsibilities are clear, was much weaker. Commitment to espoused 
organizational goals, seen as worthwhile and obtainable, was weaker still.  
In the previous sections, we saw that the teachers were strongly motivated by a sense of 
service, pleasure, and identification with their work, yet also high challenge. Here we ask how these 
relatively strong, but diffuse forces might be channeled into more precise goals and directed 
activities that might help teachers concentrate effort and move them beyond a diffuse quest to do 
their best (Locke & Latham, 1990). For example, a diffuse quest for equity might become goal 
oriented if equity is more clearly defined in terms of outcomes. Or equity goals may be oriented 
towards organizational goals, for example, if outcomes are defined in terms of accountability targets 
that may over time narrow achievement gaps.  
When we asked the teachers about their goals, we did not presuppose a specific definition of 
that term. We let interviewees describe what they considered to be their goals. We assumed that 
organizational goals would be relevant and meaningful to them if they talked about the latter and 
saw them as influencing their work in a positive or motivating way. Once interviewees had described 
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their own goals, we prompted for degree of precision of personal goals and the role of 
organizational goals in their work.  
When asked about their goals, most teachers made spontaneous reference to a wide variety 
of orientations, not all of them goals by our definition. On the whole, when interviewees named 
goals they tended to be vague purposes or intentions to carry out activities, such as helping students 
to become better readers, writers, critical thinkers, or long-life learners, or getting students ready for 
college:  
…giving students the tools and opportunities they need to be able to go to college, 
to be able to go to a training school, to be able to be successful, to be able to do 
politics and social things, to not to be screwed over by other forces. (School B, 3)  
 
By contrast, precise and measurable performance goals for either students or teachers were rarely 
mentioned despite repeated prompting. On occasions when specificity comes into the picture, it is 
reflected in immediate learning targets or objectives associated with particular units or lessons: 
Well, what comes to my mind is when I’m in instruction, we set learning targets for 
our students.  And so then any time we’re doing something, it’s specifically to help 
them get to this learning target.  Often I’ll have a learning target that’s kind of a 
bigger idea, and then I’ll break it into sub kind of skills or mini goals.  Because one 
big thing can be kind of complex.  And so then I’ll focus on like one of those things 
for students.  And when I talk about learning targets, you know, two-thirds of them 
are content focused, but a third of them are process and skill focused.  So some of 
them are like solving problems.  Whereas some of them are explaining the gas laws 
or something like that…So we’re always working towards those goals. (School C, 21)  
 
Even though the great majority of interviewees did not state quantitative performance targets, such 
as test or evaluation scores, as goals, some teachers were not unfamiliar with the logic of formulating 
specific achievement goals and some even identified precise organizational performance goals, for 
instance, “We set school wide goals, so this year our big goal… is to have an API of 800 or 70% 
proficiency [in math].”  But these types of goals seemed rather irrelevant as motivational force. 
Some interviewees mentioned these goals as sources of negative pressure or stress: “The reason I 
don’t remember [the quantitative targets] is because it stressed me out so much that I said, you know 
what?  Ignore it” (School B, 8). Others doubted the energizing power of precise goals preferring to 
be carried forth by the “bigger picture:”  
I feel like I know how to go through the motions of setting that goal, taking steps to 
work toward it, and then reflecting on what I’ve done.  But that doesn’t feel like what 
really is driving me.  It feels a little bit bigger picture than any one of those kind of 
specific instructional goals, if that makes sense. (School C, 20)  
 
An important source of goals was teachers’ own learning. Goal statements in this area refer to 
interviewees’ personal growth. Most often these goals revolve around specific instructional strategies 
or formats, for example “getting better in asking questions to students,” or “organizing more 
effective lesson openings or closings.” Some of these goals seem to have been formulated in 
collaboration with colleagues, instructional coaches, or instructional supervisors: “I set goals when I 
do a [peer] review with [my instructional coach].”  Continuous improvement appears to be an 
important feature for teachers in all three schools. While goals may be a marker of this process, the 
fluidity of the learning process and the actual experience of organic growth was a more compelling 
motivational force:  
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Right, yeah I mean, in general to be perfectly honest, because I know there’s not 
going to be any follow up, I don’t really work very hard to achieve the goals. […] I 
think the goals are fine but that a person, you know, goals alone don’t make a person 
better, right?  What I really, you know, need is help in planning. How I’m going to 
get better at that and, you know, somebody observing me attempting to implement it 
and giving me feedback about how it looked and, you know, there are a lot of steps 
that are kind of missing. (School C, 17)  
  
In sum, goals are plentiful in the three charter schools and they come in a variety of formats, some 
quite general, others quite specific. With regard to student learning outcomes, stated goals tended to 
be diffuse or they referred to unit objectives. With regard to instruction, goals were formulated 
around specific strategies or practices. With regard to teacher professional learning, goals were 
formulated as personal and formative growth goals, not as summative goals subject to evaluation.  
A connection between teachers’ stated goals and organizational performance goals that may 
link system quality indicators and measurement of performance to a sense of being motivated was 
largely absent in the interviews. Precise performance goals that could lend themselves to evaluation 
did not seem to loom large as motivators in any of the three schools.  
The relative weakness of setting precise personal goals and of internalizing organizational 
goals is corroborated when teachers rate the importance and usefulness of various performance 
indicators that play a role in the three schools’ performance management system. Despite high-
stakes accountability with its presumably precise performance targets, in force for the entire duration 
of the schools’ existence, high skepticism prevailed. Scales that measure the perceived clarity and 
usefulness of the State Standards Test (CST) for one’s work show means in the negative range. Only 
8 out of 31 respondents rated the usefulness of the State Tests as positive. For externally scored 
teaching evaluations (SET=Summative Evaluation of Teaching), a relatively novel feature for the 
schools, the ratio is 7 out of 26 respondents. Internal measures of performance, such as principal 
supervision (FET=Formative Evaluation of Teaching) and peer evaluations, as well as an internally 
administered writing test received better ratings. The bonus pay formula was seen as least useful.  
 
 
Figure 3. Usefulness of Performance Management Criteria 
*=Number of cases (n) 
 
It should perhaps not come as a surprise that within the quantitative data no clear 
correlational patterns among goal setting scales and between goal setting scales and pro-social 
commitments and identification with work are discernible. All correlations are weak and 
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insignificant. Given the small sample size, this pattern should not be over interpreted lest one 
commits a Type 2 error and states “false negatives” where perhaps an association exists. In light of 
the qualitative data, however, the link between diffuse service commitments and goal setting seems 
doubtful. In repeated interviews, we failed to find teachers making a clear connection between their 
work challenges and goal clarity, and between their goals and pro-social or service commitments. 
Plentiful, multi-faceted, and shifting “goals” (in the language of the teachers) were imbued in the 
teachers’ descriptions of their work, but these “goals” rarely seem to rise to the level of 
concentrating one’s work effort in terms of specific goals described in goal setting theory.  
Research in the tradition of public service motivation discussed above asks how goal setting 
might be embedded in more diffuse service commitments and identification with one’s work. For 
schools, this interaction could potentially be powerful. When precise performance goals are 
reinforced by the energy that identification with the work, pro-social commitments, pleasure, or duty 
can generate, they may be pursued with more vigor. But there is little indication in the qualitative 
data from the three charter schools, and (with all statistical precaution) no contradictory evidence 
from the quantitative data, that such synergistic confluence of motivational energy took place. This 
finding has serious consequences for the power of organizational goal setting and extrinsic 
incentives. In a logic of management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goals, some precision 
in goals and some internalization of organizational goals as personal ones ought to occur (Kreps, 
1997). In the three charter schools, however, goal ambiguity and uncertainty coupled with 
skepticism towards organizational performance goals prevailed.  
 
Material Rewards and Prestige 
 
In the quantitative ratings, acceptability of performance-contingent rewards was fairly high 
(see above), but material rewards and prestige were named as weak motivators. We allowed that this 
pattern may be a reflection of occupational ideology rather than a reflection of one’s work motives. 
The qualitative material, however, suggests the latter. Interviewed teachers were clearly sensitive to 
material benefits, but almost all of them were adamant that extra money did not “help them to do a 
better job,” or “try harder or change practices.” In their eyes, extra pay was a good idea and 
legitimate mechanism to reward teachers, and they felt positive about receiving bonuses. But for 
most, the bonuses were already earned before they were disbursed. They were justified as rewards for 
hard work, effort, and service continuously expended in these trying school contexts, a pattern that 
is consistent with other studies (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012; Marsh et al., 2011). The quotes from 
two teachers stand for many more:  
I mean, you stick with it, you keep working to grow, to improve your teaching 
practice.  You keep focusing on self-improvement.  There should be remuneration 
for that, for meeting those mile markers (School A, 9) 
 
Obviously money is not the motivator of why I do what I’m doing, but it certainly 
would be nice to be recognized for my consistent work. (School C, 9) 
 
Several teachers stated that if the bonus money was there, they would “happily take it.” Since theirs 
was an underpaid line of work to begin with, “educators are better off with a little extra“ or some 
“extra appreciation.” The clear link between performance indicators, measured test and evaluation 
scores, and monetary amounts was doubted. Two main reasons were given. One had to do with self-
worth, the other with validity. Interviewees did not want monetary rewards to interfere with their 
sense of ownership and commitment; money would devalue these commitments which, by 
themselves, already motivated them to work with maximum effort. And skepticism abounded that 
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any discrete performance indicators could validly capture the full scope of their work engagement. 
As two teachers explained: 
I think the reason that educators are paid so poorly is because we are not deemed 
professionals and it is supposedly an altruistic or martyr system.  Like, I am a teacher 
because I want to create change not because I want money.  I think there is a danger 
in paying for success because how do you gauge that success.  Do you know what I 
mean?  That is going to really make many people not want to work at lower income 
schools because it is much more difficult to create improvement.  Many times 
rewards based on money are based on test scores and that is problematic.  I mean of 
course you are going to feel rewarded if you get money, but I would have a really 
hard time working in that system unless I knew that system was actually assessing 
teacher ability, not just teacher ability but teacher dedication. (School A, 3). 
 
So, I mean, I got a bonus check, so I know how much money I got, but I don't really 
know why or where that came from, just because, personally – I don't know – for 
me, this grant has been, like, I think it's amazing and, of course, I'm grateful for it.  
But, at the same time, I don't know − for me, I don't want to be motivated by 
money.  And so I just decided not to look. (School C, 12) 
 
Thus many interviewed teachers described monetary rewards, in the language of self-determination 
theory, as something external to their motivation, something they accept, but not something that 
regulates them or energizes them in their work.  
Prestige or reputation could be more externally or internally sourced. Among survey 
respondents prestige is modestly and significantly correlated with duty (.5), a more outward 
orientation than ownership or identification with one’s work. In the interviews, prestige or 
reputation was associated with the need to be seen as “hard workers” who are “willing to try new 
things,” being seen as such by members of the school community. Being recognized by parents as 
committed and engaged and receiving positive feedback from students were described as desirable: 
“I’m held in the esteem of my students because they are kind of my main – they’re my main critics.” 
In School C, there was a pervasive pride of working in a highly effective and popular school that 
succeeded in sending almost all students to post-secondary institutions. In School B, there was pride 
that the school managed to educate students that had been rejected from more mainstream district 
environments. In the eyes of interviewees, another important source of prestige was colleagues 
recognizing one’s hard work and tireless engagement in learning and improving. Thus, the sources 
of prestige were primarily school-internal, diffuse, and derived from judgments of those with whom 
teachers directly interacted. Interviewees did not make any connections between prestige or 
reputation and specific performance indicators or monetary rewards, save the pride in moving large 
numbers of disadvantaged students from high school into post-secondary placements.  
 
Summary of Modal Pattern 
 
Qualitative material and rough quantifications speak to a wide-spread pattern in these charter 
schools. Serving disadvantaged students, doing social justice work, insisting on the deservingness of 
marginalized students and providing them opportunities through personal engagement and 
connection that society denies them make up the substance of work motivation. Narratives of 
personal experiences and life course decisions brought many of these young teachers to see their 
work as part of their identity. But the fulfillment of precise personal or organizational performance 
goals is not an important source of identification. Personal goals are aplenty, but in their diffuseness 
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and ambiguity lose the motivational punch of specific goal setting. Instead, the fluidity of personal 
growth for both students and teachers, and achieving tangible opportunities for life (high school 
graduation, college) generate energy. System or organizational performance measures of the day are 
acknowledged in their existence, but they do not go “deep” in motivating teachers. In the eyes of 
most interviewees, money in the form of bonus rewards is already deserved for strenuous effort and 
committed service given the perception that theirs is a line of underpaid and undervalued work. If 
anything, it is concern for prestige, looking good in the eyes of those who are immediately 
knowledgeable of one’s work, that perhaps instills a concern for meeting organizational goals.  
 
Organization Level Differences 
 
 Organizational differences with respect to motivation patterns were not pronounced. To 
begin with, the schools explored through quantitative data looked fairly similar. Organizational 
culture and leadership were rated quite similarly across the three sites. In addition, we interviewed 
school leaders. We asked them about school mission, their own values, and emphases in leading 
their schools. The schools had different aspirations, for example the difference between a stress on 
academics in School C and social-emotional support in B. When we asked about organizational goal 
setting, they all made reference to the state’s Academic Performance Index and the desire to have 
large proportions of students entering post-secondary college. But none of them pointed to precise 
or quantitative goals that they pursued with their staff and none of them described efforts in their 
schools that were driven by these kinds of goals, though they embraced the performance 
management system.  
 
Table 7  
Leadership and School Culture 
  Supportive 
Leadership 
Moral 
Leadership 
School 
Management 
Autonomy Open 
Communication 
Collegiality 
School A 
 
4.03 4.05 3.24 4.12 3.79 3.91 
School B 
 
4.06 3.92 3.33 3.94 3.83 3.63 
School C 
 
3.94 4.06 3.35 4.28 3.89 4.10 
General 
 
3.99 4.03 3.31 4.17 3.85 3.96 
 
In this organizational context, none of the motivation-related scales or items showed 
noteworthy discrepancies across cases. In a next step, we took the 35 individual profiles displayed in 
the radar charts. In our clustering exercise, we grouped them into school level clusters in order to 
see if we could find organization specific patterns. We could not. Perhaps this is not surprising given 
how similar the schools are in their organizational culture. In the goal setting dimension, 
organizations should make the biggest difference. They did not. We did, however, see individual 
level differences in the spider web profiles.  
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Individual Cases 
 
The individual cases narrated here enrich the qualitative analysis with individual teachers’ 
personal reflection about their situation and their motivational preferences, and they shed light on 
the range of individual motives within the modal pattern. Towards this end, we selected two cases 
that differ according to service commitments, ownership or identification with work, goal setting, 
and extrinsic rewards on quantitative variables, displayed in radar charts or spider web diagrams 
below. Both cases fill in personal detail. In our sample, Adarsh exemplifies the idealistic side of the 
modal motivational pattern, while Jane is much more goal-oriented than the majority of her 
colleagues, yet both cases, on the whole, are variations of the main pattern.   
 
Figure 4. Adarsh’s Motivational Profile 
 
Figure 5. Jane’s Motivational Profile 
 
For Ardash, goal setting, monetary reward, and concern for prestige pale in comparison to 
pro-social commitment, identification with, and pleasure in, her work. Inspired by her 
grandmother’s activism in Gandhi’s struggle for freedom in India, and especially for rural education, 
Adarsh wanted to be a teacher since she was three. It was important for Adarsh to communicate to 
us that she was educated in “the third world.” She describes herself as “being a second language 
learner herself, many times overlooked by her teachers,” and that “she struggled with English.” This 
previous experience motivated her to become an English teacher, one with empathy for her 
students’ struggles through adversity. She shared that her main commitment is “to help students to 
become proficient in English.” In her view, being proficient in English is the “ticket to freedom and 
seeing the world.”  
 Adarsh goes to work everyday motivated by “the faces of the kids.” In her view, students are 
not just students but “her kids.” She connects with her students in an emotional way.  She says that 
her workload sometimes gets overwhelming and she feels stressed, unappreciated, and unsupported. 
Yet, she still puts her students first no matter what: “My work is Justin and Marvin and Jessica and 
Sylvia.” Adarsh’s desire to help students makes her start at 4 am in the morning and begin her work 
of planning, teaching, daily grading, and giving feedback to students. When “a student moves from 
barely reading and writing to reading and writing at grade level” she gets her biggest reward. In her 
classroom she is committed to do what she calls “social justice work” which consists of creating, 
what she calls, “unthinkable literacy” for kids who “do not wish to read.” She is careful not to make 
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her students feel threatened or ashamed, emphasizing non-cognitive skills along with cognitive ones. 
The cultivation of relationships with students is paramount.  
 Adarsh feels that her “work is her life.” Her standards of quality, the way she sees it, far 
surpasses what standardized measures can capture. She does not feel recognized for the good work 
that she believes she puts out. But despite some bitter experiences, she will do this work for “the 
rest of my career as an adult living in the world.”  
 When asked about her specific goals she, first, mentions college readiness, complex literacy, 
emotional intelligence, artistic intelligence, and creativity as important goals for her work. She also 
wants to pursue improvement goals defined with her supervisor in her annual growth plan, and she 
refers to lesson objectives. Wrapping up she says: “The short-term goal is to work with a text or 
work with a small unit plan. The long-term goal is getting you ready for the world.”  Adarsh is 
willing to face conflict when school-wide measures do not match what she perceives as her students’ 
needs. She is willing to “push back” against standards and evaluation criteria that are not sensitive to 
the reality of her students. State assessments, for example, are in no way, holistic enough to embrace 
“the kind of work that is going on in [her] classroom.”   
 When it comes to monetary rewards she is clear: “I don’t care for the monetary rewards, I 
work for the kids.” She believes that “money is stupid” because money “makes people do stupid 
things.” She thinks that money distorts peoples’ behaviors, distracts the attention from “the work 
that we do for the kids”, and “encourages competition among the staff.”  Though Adarsh cannot 
deny appreciating bonus money, she sees money as a violation of her ethic of work and as a 
distraction from the main purpose of her work: kids.  
 In our sample, Jane is less moved by pro-social commitments, ownership, and pleasure as she 
is moved by goals and prestige, relative to other study participants.  She does exhibit the ‘classical’ 
service motivation. She always had “the expectation to do things for others.” She believes this 
expectation was instilled in her early involvement in her church and in community service. Since 
high school and college, she wanted to “advance things that she felt important” and “would make a 
difference in society.” This desire brought her to serve as a volunteer in teaching. But Jane did not 
go into teaching right away after college. She wandered in different careers that she later considered 
“pointless.” She describes it this way: “A lot of motivation was wanting to do something where I 
really felt I was changing society.”  
 Coming from a privileged background, she knew that students from wealthier families “will 
go to college whether [she] work[s] with them or not.” Working with this kind of student she is “not 
going to achieve social change.” That is why she felt inspired to teach “students who don’t have that 
support somewhere else, who don’t have someone at home pushing them and who even knows how 
to prepare them for the future.”  Jane knows if she does “good and hard work,” she “will influence 
students’ opportunities in the future.”  
Her pro-social engagement is tempered by pragmatic pursuits. Jane connects to her work on 
a daily basis because she “really likes what she does”. She explains to us that she “look[s] forward to 
students interacting with” her, when she creates good lessons. She “feel[s] excited to teach things 
that students are interested in.” She feels most rewarded when “students who struggled figure out a 
lesson or achieve something” beyond her expectations. It is at that moment when she feels proud of 
her work. Jane cares about what her colleagues and administrators think about her work. Also, she 
likes to feel that she is a high performer, not for external recognition, she says, but for herself. Yet, 
getting signals of good performance from others “is a matter of personal pride.” For her, external 
rankings of performance are “not an incentive to work harder,” but when she feels “dissatisfied with 
her own performance”, she becomes activated.  
  Compared to Ardash and the modal pattern across all interviewees, Jane is more driven by 
specific goals. But specificity is provided, not by longer term student performance goals or any kind 
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of teacher performance ratings, but by goals directly related to her teaching. She says, “For any unit, 
activity, or assignment, I would know what my objectives are.” Some examples of these goals are: 
getting better at explaining how a piece of evidence proves a point; making a persuasive logical 
argument; getting better at understanding the nuance of a text. Sometimes she finds it difficult to 
accomplish her goals. Sometimes students “get” the lesson objective, but do not apply the skill later. 
Her goals are all about student mastery of content and skill.  
 Jane thinks that monetary rewards are “a good idea.” But she also sees clear boundaries. She 
does not think that her colleagues at School C require any money to motivate them. They already do 
all they can. She is convinced that anyone “who is incentivized solely by money is not going to be 
good at anything in any profession.” But money, she contends, has a role to play for those who are 
not motivated to work as professionals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 In the wake of educational reform in the United States over the last decade or so, weighty 
performance goals and incentives were introduced into the school system that are extrinsic, sharp, 
explicit, and high-stakes in nature, relative to earlier eras. State and federal accountability systems, 
with standardized assessments, quantitative growth targets, and sanctions for not meeting those 
targets, had been a reality since 1999 in the state where the three schools are located. Spawned by 
the federal Teacher Incentive Fund initiative and following on the heels of high stakes 
accountability, more refined performance management systems added value-added measures, 
standardized teaching evaluations, bonus pay, and career ladders.  
 Presumably, the schools whose account is given here should be fertile soil for incentive-
driven performance management. At the time of conducting the study, the schools had been used to 
state and federal accountability expectations for 13 years, and they volunteered to participate in the 
pay for performance pilot program funded by the US-federal government. Compared to typical 
public schools, the three schools were accustomed to charter self-management, market competition, 
and deregulated labor-management relations. These conditions, coupled with the relative youth of 
the teaching force, should have been conducive for extrinsic incentives to take hold and to influence 
work motivation in substantial ways. Indeed, while the schools had no choice participating in the 
accountability system, and while competition with regular district schools were a fact of life, the 
performance management system, which brought the researchers into the schools, was the schools’ 
own choice. And indeed, we confirmed Ballou & Podgursky's (1993) finding that acceptance of 
performance-contingent pay among teachers might be much higher than one would expect. But as 
we saw, accepting an incentive as a good idea does not mean that one is regulated by it in one’s 
intent or actions.  
 Following the body of literature on teacher work motivation that developed 
contemporaneously with incentive policies, one could expect a motivational pattern in which system-
generated motives, such as attaining specific organizational goals, preventing sanctions, or garnering 
rewards, might play an important role in shaping teacher work motivation. We wondered if this was 
indeed the case, and if so, what would happen to autonomously generated, intrinsic, or service motives 
that research from a previous era believed to be dominant work motives. Did intrinsic motives 
endure or prevail despite the presumed power of extrinsic incentives? Were extrinsic and intrinsic 
motives juxtaposed with equal strengths?  Did extrinsic incentives and goals manage to become 
internalized and self-determined? Or were intrinsic orientations reduced to second place or crowded 
out by more rational calculations of self-interest?  
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 We tested the relative strength of several distinct work motives: pro-social and service 
commitments, identification with work (ownership, pleasure, duty), prestige, material benefits, and 
task specific goal setting. These motives array from more externally to more internally regulated 
ones, from more specific to more diffuse ones. From the outset, we steered clear of all notions of 
dichotomy along the dimensions of intrinsic versus extrinsic, internal versus external, bureaucratic 
versus professional, and so on. Instead, being mindful of the teacher work motivation research 
conducted in the pre-incentive era and concurrent with the era of extrinsic incentives, we explored a 
spectrum of motives and assumed that regardless of where a motive might have originated, for 
example stemming from system or organizational demands or stemming from an individual’s 
personal life course, internalization occurs on a continuum so that what erstwhile may have 
appeared as alien and controlling to teachers, for example an externally generated evaluation score of 
their teaching, may over time become integrated into the fullness of their varied work motives and 
may subjectively be experienced as motivating autonomous action.  
Public service motivation (PSM) research has shown that despite a strong momentum in 
many countries during the current era to manage public sector work along private business 
principles, public sector workers have maintained a pattern of public service motivation that is 
distinguished from the private sector. Service, altruism, citizenship, and notions of the common 
good are values that regulate public sector workers even when their performance is increasingly 
managed through goal setting, competition, and appeal to self-interested material rewards.  
The three semi-public organizations we investigated are an interesting hybrid. On one hand, 
they are open to the public management principles advocated by neo-liberal public management  
doctrines, on the other hand their work is carried out in a societal environment characterized by 
social deprivation, adversity, and inequity that pushes to the forefront issues of fairness, justice, and 
service, and that makes the accrual of self-interested rewards a very uncertain calculus relative to the 
likelihood of sanctions and frustrations. Like many public and charter schools whose role it is to 
educate populations that are consigned to the bottom rungs of society’s stratification ladder, the 
three schools examined here responded to their challenge with a distinct organizational mission of 
social justice and service.  
In a nutshell, we found through both quantitative and qualitative data that for teachers in the 
three charter schools a constellation of public service motives pre-dominated. This constellation 
mostly consisted of diffuse pro-social commitments, ideologies of fairness and equity, a belief in the 
moral deservingness of deprived student populations in opposition to societal neglect and 
compensating for weak family support, the need for personal engagement in social-political change, 
identification with one’s work as a personal calling, and the pleasure of constantly learning, growing, 
and improving as instructors and persons in relationship with students and colleagues.  
By comparison, monetary rewards were embraced as already deserved. Even the idealists 
who ideologically objected to reward money would gladly take it when it was offered. But neither 
rewards, nor accountability, seemed to regulate behavior in a deep way. They were in the picture, 
and they were taken into consideration, but they did not incentivize specific behaviors or 
performances, save the opportunistic acceptance of available benefits for whatever behavior the 
system was willing to pay out. Prestige was not bestowed by official performance statuses within the 
accountability system, but came as a result of personal judgment of those who had an immediate 
insight into one’s work.  
We began this paper by asking why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational 
goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic reward 
systems had expected. In this study, we deliberately looked at schools, public charter schools with a 
social justice mission, that could have perhaps been fertile grounds for extrinsic incentives to 
connect to service commitments. It is perhaps not as surprising that in these schools rather 
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traditional patterns of intrinsic motivation and internalized pro-social commitments prevailed. It is 
perhaps more surprising that motivation patterns that Dan Lortie may have been familiar with in the 
1970’s showed their enduring power in the schools, despite the great institutional convulsions of 
public management reform of the 1990s and 2000s that the schools were part of. But the great 
surprise finding came in the goal dimension. For any kind of performance management system 
banking on extrinsic incentives, goal setting is the fulcrum. If rewards are to regulate work, they 
need to go through goals. No clear goals guiding teachers’ work -- and the rewards, or sanctions, 
become arbitrary in their regulative function. In public service motivation research, goals are 
discussed in various ways. As we discussed earlier, those who stress goal ambiguity as an ingrained 
feature of public service work search for more diffuse commitments as main motivators. In other 
models, goal setting is in the center. Public service mission of the agency (for example schools) and 
its incentives and rewards, in combination with employees’ values, produce a sense of overall job 
importance and commitment to organizational goals. Organizational goals, with their specific, 
attainable, and challenging characteristics, come to regulate work. Goals are central motivators. They 
are reinforced and aided by organizational mission and personal values.  
 There was no evidence in the data of such a dynamic among the teachers we studied. Instead 
it was striking that teachers understood “goals” as an enormously fluid and multi-faceted concept. 
No discrete performance goals stuck out that were clearly marked by either interviewees or survey 
respondents as guiding intent or actions. Goals were plentiful. There were learning and growth 
goals. There were goals to carry out certain activities. There were the objectives for today’s lesson or 
this week’s unit. There were broad images of what students ought to be able to do after having been 
taught. There were life goals, relationship goals, goals for citizenship, and goals for all participants in 
the educative process to feel good about themselves and each other. The most important 
quantitative performance goals that were watched carefully were the percentage of students who 
graduated from high school and went to post-secondary institutions. These goals were seen as 
reflective of the schools’ mission to equalize educational opportunity and to open up tangible life 
chances for students.  
Overall, the findings suggest that public management principles centering on goals and 
extrinsic incentives have had a fairly weak influence on teachers’ work motivation in the three 
charter schools in the past and would have a difficult time connecting to teachers’ deeper work 
motivation in the future. What the research uncovered instead is a pronounced public service 
motivation that most strongly responds to the challenging social context and to the adversities and 
needs that students in this environment expose teachers to. To speak with Frey & Osterloh (2001), 
acceptance of extrinsic incentives, freedom to manage, deregulated labor, etc. were far from 
crowding out the power of this public service motivation. Nor did the tools of incentive-driven 
performance management “crowd in” and become internalized into the deeper strata of teachers’ 
work motivation.  
It is important to keep in mind that this research was not intended to explore responses to 
policy or test the theory of action of accountability or pay for performance incentives. Our main 
approach in the survey was to give teachers a menu of possible motives that they believe guide their 
work as teachers. Our main questions to teachers in the interviews was not: how do accountability 
goals, monetary rewards, or incentives influence your work. Rather we asked, what gets you out of 
bed every morning to come to this school; what goals do you pursue when you do your work. We 
found that the language of “goals” came easy to the interviewed teachers and goal setting was 
pervasive, but in its pervasiveness it lost the specificity and clarity that goal setting theory 
presupposes as the motivational force of goals.  
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Limitation 
 
Three small charter schools do not make a pattern from which one can derive direct 
practical lessons for a “system” of performance management. In this regard our study is limited. It is 
quite conceivable that there are teachers, schools, districts, or charter networks in which extrinsic 
incentives, most notably the threat of sanctions, crowd out service motivations with the result that 
work motivation is high as long as self-interest motives continue to be satisfied, or demoralization 
sets in when results are not forthcoming (see Finnigan & Gross, 2007). Or that there are 
organizations that successfully fuse self interest and social justice commitment. In such 
organizations, a strong self-interested drive to garner the rewards and prestige that the system’s 
extrinsic incentives have on offer may also be seen as expressive of ones’ social justice and service 
commitments, a pattern that we initially conjectured we might find in the three charters schools we 
studied.  
 
Relevance 
 
The relevance of this study is two-fold. Theoretically we wanted to show that teacher work 
motivation research, especially in the era of extrinsic incentives, benefits when multiple motivational 
dynamics are explored. These dynamics ought to be informed by work motivation theories that train 
the lens on varied conceptualizations of what constitutes core energetic forces under given 
circumstances of work. We wanted to show that expectancy, goal setting, self-concept, and self-
determination theories embedded in an established line of research on public service motivation, can 
potentially yield understandings of the deep and multifaceted layers of teacher motivation under 
adverse circumstances. An eye to a critical sociology of status and deservingness helps understand 
the social context of work motivation. 
If we extrapolated the pattern found here and imagined a suitable performance management, 
incentive, or accountability system for the type of teachers or organizations that came into view in 
this study, we would have to question the idea that systems banking on the power of extrinsic 
incentives, such as the now-faded NCLB system, could get us very far. If after 13 years of high 
stakes accountability, managerial freedoms for charter schools, and voluntary participation in a pay 
for performance system, we find the shallowest roots of incentives in the fertile soil of public service 
motivation, we need to search for new system designs. Here is not the space to get into design 
details. But two design principles are suggested by this research. We need to find ways for any sort 
of performance management to tap into, reinforce, and crowd in, positive and affirming 
commitments for equity, justice, and moral deservingness of marginalized students and their 
families, in contradistinction to subjecting teachers to a blanket system of corrective action. We 
further need to think hard about ways to develop the goal function in schools in a way that delivers 
on precision and leaves room for ambiguity and the fluidity of personal growth. 
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Appendix 
 
Teacher Motivation Scales 
Items 
Challenge (Cronbach’s α=.79) 
A high degree of skill and know how is necessary to do my job well. 
My job is easy.a 
Jobs like mine are quite demanding day after day. 
The work objectives in my job require a great deal of effort. 
My work is very challenging. 
Pro-social commitment (Cronbach’s α=.73) 
Because I do my best when I’m working on a task that contributes to the wellbeing of others. 
Because I get energized by working on tasks that have the potential to benefit others. 
Because I prefer to work on tasks that allow me to have a positive impact on others. 
Ownership/ identification (Cronbach’s α=.78) 
Because it has become a fundamental part of who I am. 
Because this job is a part of my life. 
Pleasure (Cronbach’s α=.83) 
Because I derive much pleasure from learning new things. 
For the satisfaction I experience from taking on interesting challenges. 
For the satisfaction I experience when I am successful at doing difficult tasks. 
Duty/Introjected regulation (Cronbach’s α=.73) 
Because I want to succeed at this job, if not I would be very ashamed of myself. 
Because I want to be a high performer in life. 
Because I want to be very good at this work, otherwise I would be very disappointed. 
Prestige (Cronbach’s α=.78) 
I work towards high evaluation scores because they enhance my standing in the school. 
It is important for me to meet performance targets so that my reputation will not be damaged. 
Meeting the expectations of the evaluation system here at the school is a matter of professional 
pride for me. 
Goal clarity (Cronbach’s α=.75) 
My responsibilities at work are very clear and specific. 
I know exactly what I am supposed to do on my job. 
Goal commitment (Cronbach’s α=.85) 
It's hard to take this goal seriously. a 
It's unrealistic for me to expect to reach this goal.a 
It is quite likely that this goal may need to be revised, depending on how things go.a 
Quite frankly, I don't care if I achieve this goal or not.a 
I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal. 
It wouldn't take much to make me abandon this goal.a 
I think this goal is a good goal to shoot for. 
Material benefits (Cronbach’s α=.81) 
For the income it provides me. 
Because it allows me to earn money. 
Because this type of work provides me with security. 
a. Values are reversed. 
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Leadership and School Culture Scales 
Items 
Collegiality (Cronbach’s α=.82) 
Most of my colleagues share my beliefs and values about what the central mission of the school 
should be. 
There is a great deal of cooperative effort among staff here. 
I can count on colleagues here when I feel down about my teaching or my students. 
In this school, the faculty discusses major decisions and sees to it that they are carried out. 
Supportive Leadership (Cronbach’s α=.68) 
The principal usually consults with staff members before s/he makes decisions that affect 
teachers. 
Staff members are recognized for a job well done. 
The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is supportive and encouraging. 
Moral Leadership (Cronbach’s α=.79) 
Places the needs of children ahead of personal and political interests. 
Models the kind of school they want to create. 
School Management (Cronbach’s α=.82) 
This school is well managed. 
Overall this school functions well. 
This school is disorganized. a 
Autonomy (Cronbach’s α=.81) 
Teachers’ expertise in the classroom domain is respected here. 
In this school, I am encouraged to be creative in my classroom. 
In this school, I am given the space to exercise my professional judgment as to what is best for 
my students. 
Open Communication (Cronbach’s α=.80) 
Faculty gatherings provide a forum to discuss different perspectives on school improvement. 
It is okay to speak up when you disagree with the powers that be. 
Open discussions about the criteria for good performance are encouraged. 
a. Values are reversed. 
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